When does hate speech cross the line into incitement of violence? And how does incitement get prosecuted around the world when it leads to violent atrocities like genocide? Are legal categories like incitement to genocide in international law all that effective at preventing or deterring this kind of speech? In her paper, Shannon Fyfe walks us through these complicated legal and philosophical questions as they played out in the trial of three media executives held by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for incitement during the Rwandan genocide. She also discusses incitement in domestic jurisdictions and the January 6 attacks in Washington DC.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\nThe judgements handed down by the ICTR in the Media case established that certain types of speech can constitute or contribute to some of the most harmful crimes under international law. By distinguishing between genocidal hate speech, genocidal incitement speech, and genocidal participation speech, I have shown how speech act theory justifies the international criminal law that places individual criminal responsibility on the perpetrators of these forms of speech. My account responds to two debates that pervade the intersection of hate speech and international criminal law: namely, the balancing of freedom of expression with the prevention of violence, and the challenge in imposing individual criminal liability for the inchoate crime of incitement to genocide.
Special Guest: Shannon Fyfe.
","summary":"Shannon Fyfe (George Mason University) talks about her paper on hate speech and prosecuting incitement to genocide in international criminal law.","date_published":"2021-09-24T09:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/70854dd8-e826-4225-8824-e9cb14b3f5b6.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":79831734,"duration_in_seconds":1995}]},{"id":"d8d5fc30-b8b1-4146-9483-79d1980145f5","title":"Foul Behavior with Victor Kumar","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/kumar","content_text":"Disgust is often thought of as a negative emotion, and even moreso when it comes to morality. Many have argued that the feeling we have when we are morally disgusted by others has a questionable evolutionary history, is not always reliably produced, and has inspired acts of great evil in our past. In his paper, Victor Kumar argues that it's not all bad though, and that moral disgust can sometimes be a fitting response to moral wrongs. Specifically, he argues that disgust is fitting when it is evoked by moral wrongs that pollute social relationships by eroding shared expectations of trust. In these cases, moral disgust can help right certain wrongs, serve as a useful tool for social signalling, and enourage political organization.\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nVictor Kumar\nThe paper\nIs Disgust a \"Conservative\" Emotion?\nHow Disgust Affects Social Judgments\nMartha Nussbaum, \"From Disgust to Humanity\"\nSteve Stich on disgust\nYuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust By Daniel Kelly\nDoes Disgust Influence Moral Judgment? by Joshua May\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nMany philosophers are skeptical of moral disgust, perhaps because they assume that it is tied exclusively to conservative norms and values. I have shown, to the contrary, that disgust is implicated in important moral norms and values that are shared by liberals and conservatives. Disgust is repurposed in ways that support these norms and values, by motivating an important form of punishment, tracking the spread of moral violations, and expressively coordinating collective action. Disgust accurately reflects the nature of certain wrongs that commonly elicit moral revulsion. Instead of ridding ourselves of disgust, then, we would do better to understand its fittingness and unfittingness, its uses and its hazards, and thus arrive at a richer appreciation of its suitability for moral life.Special Guest: Victor Kumar.","content_html":"Disgust is often thought of as a negative emotion, and even moreso when it comes to morality. Many have argued that the feeling we have when we are morally disgusted by others has a questionable evolutionary history, is not always reliably produced, and has inspired acts of great evil in our past. In his paper, Victor Kumar argues that it's not all bad though, and that moral disgust can sometimes be a fitting response to moral wrongs. Specifically, he argues that disgust is fitting when it is evoked by moral wrongs that pollute social relationships by eroding shared expectations of trust. In these cases, moral disgust can help right certain wrongs, serve as a useful tool for social signalling, and enourage political organization.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nMany philosophers are skeptical of moral disgust, perhaps because they assume that it is tied exclusively to conservative norms and values. I have shown, to the contrary, that disgust is implicated in important moral norms and values that are shared by liberals and conservatives. Disgust is repurposed in ways that support these norms and values, by motivating an important form of punishment, tracking the spread of moral violations, and expressively coordinating collective action. Disgust accurately reflects the nature of certain wrongs that commonly elicit moral revulsion. Instead of ridding ourselves of disgust, then, we would do better to understand its fittingness and unfittingness, its uses and its hazards, and thus arrive at a richer appreciation of its suitability for moral life.
Special Guest: Victor Kumar.
","summary":"Victor Kumar (Boston University) talks about his paper on disgust, and why sometimes at least, disgust is a fitting reaction to moral wrongs.","date_published":"2021-09-13T08:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/d8d5fc30-b8b1-4146-9483-79d1980145f5.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":51887879,"duration_in_seconds":1621}]},{"id":"d45dd851-16b1-40bc-beed-4252429269dc","title":"Alive Inside with Andrew Peterson","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/peterson","content_text":"As we learn more and more about the brain, researchers are developing new neuroscientific methods that can help diagnose patients with traumatic brain injury. For example, some of these methods might even be able to tell us that patients who otherwise appear unresponsive are actually still \"alive inside\". That's an amazing idea, but the story doesn't stop there. As such technology develops, it raises a number of ethical questions about how it works and how to use. In this paper, Andrew and his coauthors investigate the benefits, harms, and costs of using neuroimaging to detect human consciousness. \n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nAndrew Peterson\nThe paper\nExperiences of family of individuals in a locked in, minimally conscious state, or vegetative state with the health care system\nEthical issues in neuroimaging after serious brain injury with Charles Weijer\nPractice guideline update recommendations summary: Disorders of consciousness\nJason Karlawish\nAdrian Owen\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nThe practice guideline update is a milestone in the history of neurology. Recommendations to use investigational neuroimaging methods are but one aspect of the guideline, and there is a need for further normative analysis of its rich content. We encourage continued debate on these issues. Bringing clarity to the underlying ethics of caring for brain‐injured patients can assist clinicians and health care institutions as they incorporate the guideline in clinical practice.\n\nWe think that investigational neuroimaging could facilitate access to opportunity for DoC patients. As the guideline highlights, investigational neuroimaging could function as a gatekeeper for continued rehabilitation, and it might also be used as a neural prosthetic, based on future technical improvements. Neuroimaging assessment could also inform clinical decisions that best reflect a patient’s values, even if pursuing those values are inconsistent with standard notions of quality of life. Opportunity‐based frameworks for healthcare justice still require conceptual refinement, and further work needs to be done to thoroughly apply such a framework to the DoC context. However, we believe that this is a promising avenue of future research to explicate the justice claims that DoC patients (or other disabled populations) have to investigational neuroimaging and other novel therapies.Special Guest: Andrew Peterson.","content_html":"As we learn more and more about the brain, researchers are developing new neuroscientific methods that can help diagnose patients with traumatic brain injury. For example, some of these methods might even be able to tell us that patients who otherwise appear unresponsive are actually still "alive inside". That's an amazing idea, but the story doesn't stop there. As such technology develops, it raises a number of ethical questions about how it works and how to use. In this paper, Andrew and his coauthors investigate the benefits, harms, and costs of using neuroimaging to detect human consciousness.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nThe practice guideline update is a milestone in the history of neurology. Recommendations to use investigational neuroimaging methods are but one aspect of the guideline, and there is a need for further normative analysis of its rich content. We encourage continued debate on these issues. Bringing clarity to the underlying ethics of caring for brain‐injured patients can assist clinicians and health care institutions as they incorporate the guideline in clinical practice.
\n\nWe think that investigational neuroimaging could facilitate access to opportunity for DoC patients. As the guideline highlights, investigational neuroimaging could function as a gatekeeper for continued rehabilitation, and it might also be used as a neural prosthetic, based on future technical improvements. Neuroimaging assessment could also inform clinical decisions that best reflect a patient’s values, even if pursuing those values are inconsistent with standard notions of quality of life. Opportunity‐based frameworks for healthcare justice still require conceptual refinement, and further work needs to be done to thoroughly apply such a framework to the DoC context. However, we believe that this is a promising avenue of future research to explicate the justice claims that DoC patients (or other disabled populations) have to investigational neuroimaging and other novel therapies.
Special Guest: Andrew Peterson.
","summary":"Andrew Peterson (GMU) talks about his paper on the ethical concerns raised by new ways of using neuroimaging to assess brain‐injured patients. ","date_published":"2021-09-06T08:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/d45dd851-16b1-40bc-beed-4252429269dc.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":57450080,"duration_in_seconds":1795}]},{"id":"5e5ca5e0-4684-47cb-b262-79f64696962a","title":"Knowledge Before Belief with Jonathan Phillips","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/phillips","content_text":"An enormous amount of research in philosophy and cognitive science has been devoted to belief representation in theory of mind, or the capacity we have to figure out what other people believe. Because of all this focus on belief, one might be tempted to think that belief is one of the most basic theory of mind capacities we have. But is that really what the evidence shows? Jonathan and his coauthors argue that it doesn’t show that at all. Instead, they argue that it’s actually the capacity to figure out what others know—rather than what they believe—that’s the more basic capacity. \n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nJonathan Phillips\nThe Paper\nDoes the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?\nKnowledge wh and false beliefs: Experimental investigations\nKnowledge before belief : Response-times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief\nDo non-human primates really represent others’ ignorance?\nHow do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden?\nLaurie Santos and The Comparative Cognition Laboratory\nJohn Turri and the Philosophical Science Lab\nFiery Cushman and the Moral Psychology Research Lab\nOri Friedman and the UWaterloo Child Cognition Lab\nAlia Martin and the Infant and Child Cognition Lab\nJoshua Knobe\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nSince the 1970’s, research has explored belief attribution in a way that brings together numerous areas of cognitive science. Our understanding of belief representation has benefitted from a huge set of interdisciplinary discoveries from developmental studies, cognitive neuroscience, primate cognition, experimental philosophy, and beyond. The result of this empirical ferment has been extraordinary, giving us lots of insight into the nature of belief representation.\n\nWe hope this paper serves as a call to arms for cognitive scientists to join researchers who have already begun to do the same for knowledge representation. Our hope is that we can marshal the same set of tools and use them to get a deeper understanding of the nature of knowledge. In doing so, we may gain better insight into the kind of representation that may— at an even more fundamental level— allow us to make sense of others’ minds.Special Guest: Jonathan Phillips.","content_html":"An enormous amount of research in philosophy and cognitive science has been devoted to belief representation in theory of mind, or the capacity we have to figure out what other people believe. Because of all this focus on belief, one might be tempted to think that belief is one of the most basic theory of mind capacities we have. But is that really what the evidence shows? Jonathan and his coauthors argue that it doesn’t show that at all. Instead, they argue that it’s actually the capacity to figure out what others know—rather than what they believe—that’s the more basic capacity.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nSince the 1970’s, research has explored belief attribution in a way that brings together numerous areas of cognitive science. Our understanding of belief representation has benefitted from a huge set of interdisciplinary discoveries from developmental studies, cognitive neuroscience, primate cognition, experimental philosophy, and beyond. The result of this empirical ferment has been extraordinary, giving us lots of insight into the nature of belief representation.
\n\nWe hope this paper serves as a call to arms for cognitive scientists to join researchers who have already begun to do the same for knowledge representation. Our hope is that we can marshal the same set of tools and use them to get a deeper understanding of the nature of knowledge. In doing so, we may gain better insight into the kind of representation that may— at an even more fundamental level— allow us to make sense of others’ minds.
Special Guest: Jonathan Phillips.
","summary":"Jonathan Phillips (Dartmouth) talks about his paper on knowledge attribution and how this capacity is actually more basic than belief representation is in theory of mind.","date_published":"2021-08-31T09:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/5e5ca5e0-4684-47cb-b262-79f64696962a.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":62776552,"duration_in_seconds":1961}]},{"id":"e986fd57-7875-40ba-8f9d-375f031df011","title":"Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment with Georgi Gardiner","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/gardiner","content_text":"Can the fact that something is morally wrong to believe affect whether the evidence you have justifies that belief? In her paper, Georgi Gardiner argues that the answer is \"no\". We should follow the evidence where it leads and align our beliefs with the evidence. And if we do that, she argues, we’ll discover that morally wrong beliefs—such as racist beliefs--simply don’t align with the evidence. On this view, racist beliefs are irrational because they are unsupported by evidence or reflect cognitive errors in statistical reasoning, not because they are immoral.\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nGeorgi Gardiner\nThe paper\nOn the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias by Tamar Gendler\nVarieties of Moral Encroachment by Renée Jorgensen Bolinger\nRadical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs by Rima Basu\nDoxastic Wronging by Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder\nBeyond Accuracy: Epistemic Flaws with Statistical Generalizations by Jessie Munton\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\n\"Advocates of moral encroachment aim to describe a person whose beliefs are epistemically impeccable—well supported by the evidence and conscientiously considered—yet morally wrong because racist. My contention is that no such belief can exist. If a belief is morally wrong then there is some corresponding prior epistemic error. The belief is not well supported by the evidence and/or it is not interpreted through a morally appropriate understanding, and that understanding is not epistemically well supported. If a belief is epistemically well supported it cannot be racist since no true fact is genuinely racist. With the right background understanding we see that since everyone is equal, any differences based on gender, race, and so on are morally insignificant.\"Special Guest: Georgi Gardiner.","content_html":"Can the fact that something is morally wrong to believe affect whether the evidence you have justifies that belief? In her paper, Georgi Gardiner argues that the answer is "no". We should follow the evidence where it leads and align our beliefs with the evidence. And if we do that, she argues, we’ll discover that morally wrong beliefs—such as racist beliefs--simply don’t align with the evidence. On this view, racist beliefs are irrational because they are unsupported by evidence or reflect cognitive errors in statistical reasoning, not because they are immoral.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\n"Advocates of moral encroachment aim to describe a person whose beliefs are epistemically impeccable—well supported by the evidence and conscientiously considered—yet morally wrong because racist. My contention is that no such belief can exist. If a belief is morally wrong then there is some corresponding prior epistemic error. The belief is not well supported by the evidence and/or it is not interpreted through a morally appropriate understanding, and that understanding is not epistemically well supported. If a belief is epistemically well supported it cannot be racist since no true fact is genuinely racist. With the right background understanding we see that since everyone is equal, any differences based on gender, race, and so on are morally insignificant."
Special Guest: Georgi Gardiner.
","summary":"Georgi Gardiner (University of Tennessee) talks about her paper arguing against moral encroachment, or the thesis that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors.","date_published":"2020-10-16T05:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/e986fd57-7875-40ba-8f9d-375f031df011.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":91888890,"duration_in_seconds":2297}]},{"id":"83f33760-0aab-4324-8985-ff0fbb83329c","title":"The Science of Wisdom with Igor Grossmann","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/grossmann","content_text":"You've heard about \"social-distancing\" but what about emotional \"self-distancing\", can that help make you wiser? Are different people wiser than others and why? Is wisdom a stable trait and if so how should we measure it? In recent years there's been an explosion of research in cognitive science into answering these questions. But along with this there's also been many disagreements between researchers about what wisdom is, how best to measure it, how it develops, and how it manifests across different situations or cultures. In this episode, Igor Grossmann discusses the efforts of the Wisdom Task Force, a group of researchers who came together in the summer of 2019 to provide a systematic evaluation of dominant theoretical and methodological positions on wisdom, and to try and reach a common position or consensus on the state of the art in wisdom research in empirical psychology.\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nIgor Grossmann\nThe Paper\nWisdom and Culture lab website\nOn Wisdom podcast\nToronto Wisdom Task Force conference presentations\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\n\"For laypersons and some scientists, wisdom can mean many things (Grossmann & Kung, 2018; Sternberg & Glück, 2019). Conceptualizations of wisdom often appear idiosyncratic, reflecting culture-bound attitudes toward abilities (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Rattan, Savani, Naidu, & Dweck, 2012), favored leadership styles (House et al., 2004), or culturallyrelevant moral characteristics (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Miller et al., 1990). These considerations notwithstanding, empirically oriented wisdom scientists around the world converge of a set of morally-grounded aspects of meta-cognition as a common psychological signature of wisdom.\n\nBuilding on the commonalities across many construct operationalizations in empirical sciences, the Wisdom Task Force has proposed the common wisdom model, defining wisdom’s psychological characteristics as morally-grounded excellence in social-cognitive processing. The task force established that by excellence in social-cognitive processing empirical scientists typically refer to PMC—i.e., features of meta-comprehension and meta-reasoning that apply to problem-solving in domains that have consequences for other people. By moral grounding, empirical wisdom scholars typically refer to a set of inter-related aspirational goals: balance of self- and otheroriented interests, pursuit of truth (vs. dishonesty), and orientation toward shared humanity. Future generations of psychological scientists can build on these insights, establishing a common language for a psychometrically sound construct operationalization across multiple levels of analysis (e.g., state vs. trait), and with an eye toward possible ways to nurture wisdom in challenging times.\"Special Guest: Igor Grossmann.","content_html":"You've heard about "social-distancing" but what about emotional "self-distancing", can that help make you wiser? Are different people wiser than others and why? Is wisdom a stable trait and if so how should we measure it? In recent years there's been an explosion of research in cognitive science into answering these questions. But along with this there's also been many disagreements between researchers about what wisdom is, how best to measure it, how it develops, and how it manifests across different situations or cultures. In this episode, Igor Grossmann discusses the efforts of the Wisdom Task Force, a group of researchers who came together in the summer of 2019 to provide a systematic evaluation of dominant theoretical and methodological positions on wisdom, and to try and reach a common position or consensus on the state of the art in wisdom research in empirical psychology.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\n"For laypersons and some scientists, wisdom can mean many things (Grossmann & Kung, 2018; Sternberg & Glück, 2019). Conceptualizations of wisdom often appear idiosyncratic, reflecting culture-bound attitudes toward abilities (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Rattan, Savani, Naidu, & Dweck, 2012), favored leadership styles (House et al., 2004), or culturallyrelevant moral characteristics (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Miller et al., 1990). These considerations notwithstanding, empirically oriented wisdom scientists around the world converge of a set of morally-grounded aspects of meta-cognition as a common psychological signature of wisdom.
\n\nBuilding on the commonalities across many construct operationalizations in empirical sciences, the Wisdom Task Force has proposed the common wisdom model, defining wisdom’s psychological characteristics as morally-grounded excellence in social-cognitive processing. The task force established that by excellence in social-cognitive processing empirical scientists typically refer to PMC—i.e., features of meta-comprehension and meta-reasoning that apply to problem-solving in domains that have consequences for other people. By moral grounding, empirical wisdom scholars typically refer to a set of inter-related aspirational goals: balance of self- and otheroriented interests, pursuit of truth (vs. dishonesty), and orientation toward shared humanity. Future generations of psychological scientists can build on these insights, establishing a common language for a psychometrically sound construct operationalization across multiple levels of analysis (e.g., state vs. trait), and with an eye toward possible ways to nurture wisdom in challenging times."
Special Guest: Igor Grossmann.
","summary":"Igor Grossmann (Waterloo) talks about his paper with the Wisdom Task Force on the state of the art of psychological research on wisdom.","date_published":"2020-10-05T07:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/83f33760-0aab-4324-8985-ff0fbb83329c.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":84461112,"duration_in_seconds":2639}]},{"id":"ecbb192a-1c84-41fd-8aa7-f189513dbd09","title":"Can’t Complain with Kathryn Norlock","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/norlock","content_text":"Complaining about our pains is often viewed as weak or soft. Kant and Aristotle went so far as to say that it should never be done. And they say it's something a real man would never do. But could complaining actually be a virtue, even when you can't fix the thing that makes you sad or mad? When done well, complaining can expose our vulnerabilities, invite others to commiserate over share pains, affirm and validate experiences, and just maybe--help us all feel a little less alone.\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nKathryn Norlock\nThe paper\nSelf-respect and protest by Bernard Boxill\nWhining, griping, and complaining: Positivity in the negativity by Robin M. Kowalski\nComplaint: From Minor Moans to Principled Protests by Julian Baggini\nAristotle's Nicomachean Ethics at 1171b10\nKant's Lectures on Ethics\nRecognition by Axel Honneth and Avishai Margalit\nCompanions in Misery by Mariana Alessandri\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nComplaining offers important personal and interpersonal benefits, to oneself when one may otherwise feel isolated or wonder if one’s perceptions are correct, and to others when complaining fulfills social expectations to be a certain kind of cooperative and discursive companion. In short, minor complaints can fulfill the functions of affirmation of one’s own presence and perceptions, or affirmation of others’ perceptions, or both. The whinge can communicate one’s insistence on acknowledgement (“I am not alone”) and/or the interest in acknowledging others (“You are not alone”).\n\nMost pressing to me are those occasions when one’s complaint is a plea for validation that one’s pains are not insignificant, and one’s complaint further seeks company to attenuate isolation in suffering, because denial of recognition frustrates basic goods of self-knowledge and autonomy. The recognition of others provides us with options, sources of control, and assistance in integrating our self-narratives; the denial of recognition can leave us trapped within ourselves.Special Guest: Kathryn Norlock.","content_html":"Complaining about our pains is often viewed as weak or soft. Kant and Aristotle went so far as to say that it should never be done. And they say it's something a real man would never do. But could complaining actually be a virtue, even when you can't fix the thing that makes you sad or mad? When done well, complaining can expose our vulnerabilities, invite others to commiserate over share pains, affirm and validate experiences, and just maybe--help us all feel a little less alone.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nComplaining offers important personal and interpersonal benefits, to oneself when one may otherwise feel isolated or wonder if one’s perceptions are correct, and to others when complaining fulfills social expectations to be a certain kind of cooperative and discursive companion. In short, minor complaints can fulfill the functions of affirmation of one’s own presence and perceptions, or affirmation of others’ perceptions, or both. The whinge can communicate one’s insistence on acknowledgement (“I am not alone”) and/or the interest in acknowledging others (“You are not alone”).
\n\nMost pressing to me are those occasions when one’s complaint is a plea for validation that one’s pains are not insignificant, and one’s complaint further seeks company to attenuate isolation in suffering, because denial of recognition frustrates basic goods of self-knowledge and autonomy. The recognition of others provides us with options, sources of control, and assistance in integrating our self-narratives; the denial of recognition can leave us trapped within ourselves.
Special Guest: Kathryn Norlock.
","summary":"Kathryn Norlock (Trent) argues that complaining can be good and is sometimes a thing that we ought to do, even when we can’t fix the thing that makes us sad. Exposing our vulnerabilities creates a space to commiserate, validate, and feel less alone.","date_published":"2020-06-04T08:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/ecbb192a-1c84-41fd-8aa7-f189513dbd09.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":52692937,"duration_in_seconds":2005}]},{"id":"1c569ccb-dc01-4518-92f2-1a98d544e8f4","title":"Situating Feminist Epistemology with Natalie Alana Ashton and Robin McKenna ","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/ashton-and-mckenna","content_text":"There is often resistance to the claim from feminist philosophy that knowledge is somehow \"socially constructed\", but what does that actually mean and is it really all that radical? Sometimes, our social situations or experiences dictate the kind of evidence we are likely to encounter and put us in a better position than others to know what's going on around us. Other times, these experiences can impact what we consider to be good evidence or what a community considers to be justified in the first place. Or maybe here's a simpler way to frame some of these ideas: when it comes to COVID-19 for example, who do you think knows best about what health care workers really need to do their jobs, CEOs or those on the front lines?\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nNatalie Alana Ashton\nRobin McKenna\nThe paper\nFear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism by Paul Boghossian\nFeminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science\nUses of value judgments in science: A general argument, with lessons from a case study of feminist research on divorce by Elizabeth Anderson\nNancy Hartsock\nScience as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry by Helen Longino\nWhose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives by Sandra Harding\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nOur aim is not so much to defend these feminist epistemologies – although we think\nthey can be defended – but rather to urge that those who defend the classical conception of knowledge have focused on the wrong target. The kind of social constructivism present in (some) feminist epistemologies is much more modest and plausible than the radical social constructivist view Boghossian considers and rejects as incoherent. \n\nSo, it’s not accurate to say that feminist epistemologists allow social factors to trump truth. They don’t dogmatically assert that justication lines up with beliefs which complement feminist aims, but instead show that certain of these feminism-complementing beliefs t with the evidence as well as, or better than, other beliefs, and that these have other (epistemic) benets to boot.Special Guests: Natalie Alana Ashton and Robin Mckenna.","content_html":"There is often resistance to the claim from feminist philosophy that knowledge is somehow "socially constructed", but what does that actually mean and is it really all that radical? Sometimes, our social situations or experiences dictate the kind of evidence we are likely to encounter and put us in a better position than others to know what's going on around us. Other times, these experiences can impact what we consider to be good evidence or what a community considers to be justified in the first place. Or maybe here's a simpler way to frame some of these ideas: when it comes to COVID-19 for example, who do you think knows best about what health care workers really need to do their jobs, CEOs or those on the front lines?
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nOur aim is not so much to defend these feminist epistemologies – although we think
\nthey can be defended – but rather to urge that those who defend the classical conception of knowledge have focused on the wrong target. The kind of social constructivism present in (some) feminist epistemologies is much more modest and plausible than the radical social constructivist view Boghossian considers and rejects as incoherent.
So, it’s not accurate to say that feminist epistemologists allow social factors to trump truth. They don’t dogmatically assert that justication lines up with beliefs which complement feminist aims, but instead show that certain of these feminism-complementing beliefs t with the evidence as well as, or better than, other beliefs, and that these have other (epistemic) benets to boot.
Special Guests: Natalie Alana Ashton and Robin Mckenna.
","summary":"Natalie Ashton (Stirling) and Robin McKenna (Liverpool) argue that feminist epistemologies can help us understand how some knowledge is socially constructed...and that this idea isn't a very radical one at all.","date_published":"2020-04-28T09:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/1c569ccb-dc01-4518-92f2-1a98d544e8f4.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":78327978,"duration_in_seconds":2447}]},{"id":"d0042e89-f8fe-4ebb-9b3f-b61a898f2cf0","title":"Games and the Art of Agency with Thi Nguyen","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/nguyen","content_text":"Are games art and if so, why? Are they important or valuable and if so, how? A lot of work tries to answer these questions in aesthetics by comparing games to various properties of traditionally acknowledged works that scholars already agree are art. But does this obscure basic features of what games are all about? Unlike most fictions, game designers don't just create a stable object, like a book or a movie. Insead, they create goals, rules, and abilities that people slip into when playing and that guide their experiences. In other words, to some extent games also recreate us, which both reveals what’s beautiful about them--and kind of like yoga--forces us to try out unfamiliar ways of being.\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nC. Thi Nguyen\nThe paper\nThe Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia by Bernard Suits\nLady Blackbird: Adventures in the Wild Blue Yonder\nGames and the Good by Tom Harkin\nAchievement by Gwen Bradford\nDefining Game Mechanics by Miguel Sicart\nSpyfall\nImertial\nRoot: A Game of Woodland Might and Right by Patrick Leder\nApocalypse World\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nIn game playing, we take on alternate agencies. The game designer can shape a specific form of agency and then pass it to the player. The clarity of the rules and the crispness of the goals make it easier for us to find our way to a novel form of agency. Thus, games allow for the curious possibility of communicating agencies. Games join, then, the various methods and technologies we have invented for recording aspects of our experience. We record sights in paintings, photographs, and movies. We record stories in novels, movies, and songs. And we record agencies in games. By letting us inscribemodes of agency in stable artifacts, games can help constitute a library of agencies.\n\nIt is easier to start trying out an unfamiliar way of being when somebody tells you exactly what to do. This is true with yoga and other physical training. If there is a mode of movement or a postural stance that is unfamiliar to me, the easiest way for me to find my way there is to submit myself to very precise direction about where to stand, where to put my feet, and how to move. A new agential mode is likewise easier to find through precise directions about what goals to pursue and which means to use. In this way, we can find our way to a greater flexibility with our agency, by temporarily submitting ourselves to strictures on that agency. Games are yoga for your agency.Special Guest: C. Thi Nguyen.","content_html":"Are games art and if so, why? Are they important or valuable and if so, how? A lot of work tries to answer these questions in aesthetics by comparing games to various properties of traditionally acknowledged works that scholars already agree are art. But does this obscure basic features of what games are all about? Unlike most fictions, game designers don't just create a stable object, like a book or a movie. Insead, they create goals, rules, and abilities that people slip into when playing and that guide their experiences. In other words, to some extent games also recreate us, which both reveals what’s beautiful about them--and kind of like yoga--forces us to try out unfamiliar ways of being.
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nIn game playing, we take on alternate agencies. The game designer can shape a specific form of agency and then pass it to the player. The clarity of the rules and the crispness of the goals make it easier for us to find our way to a novel form of agency. Thus, games allow for the curious possibility of communicating agencies. Games join, then, the various methods and technologies we have invented for recording aspects of our experience. We record sights in paintings, photographs, and movies. We record stories in novels, movies, and songs. And we record agencies in games. By letting us inscribemodes of agency in stable artifacts, games can help constitute a library of agencies.
\n\nIt is easier to start trying out an unfamiliar way of being when somebody tells you exactly what to do. This is true with yoga and other physical training. If there is a mode of movement or a postural stance that is unfamiliar to me, the easiest way for me to find my way there is to submit myself to very precise direction about where to stand, where to put my feet, and how to move. A new agential mode is likewise easier to find through precise directions about what goals to pursue and which means to use. In this way, we can find our way to a greater flexibility with our agency, by temporarily submitting ourselves to strictures on that agency. Games are yoga for your agency.
Special Guest: C. Thi Nguyen.
","summary":"C. Thi Nguyen (Utah Valley/University of Utah) argues that games are a unique form of art and a valuable tool for human self-development. By creating rules and abilities, they specify new modes of agency for their players to temporarily adopt, which both reveals what’s beautiful about them--and kind of like yoga--forces us to try out unfamiliar ways of being.","date_published":"2020-04-15T08:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/d0042e89-f8fe-4ebb-9b3f-b61a898f2cf0.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mpeg","size_in_bytes":62635282,"duration_in_seconds":1957}]},{"id":"cebc1cfb-74fa-4f14-819c-aa908491cf5f","title":"The Unreliability of Naive Introspection with Eric Schwitzgebel","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/schwitzgebel","content_text":"How well do you know your own feelings? Is our ability to know this about ourselves less reliable than what we know about the outside world around us? Is there anything we can do to make ourselves less \"naive\" and improve the reliability of introspection about conscious experiences?\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nEric Schwitzgebel\nThe Paper\nThe Splintered Mind\nAlison Gopnik\nIntrospection\nSelf-Knowledge\nEdward Titchener\nIntrospective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nDescartes, I think, had it quite backwards when he said the mind—including especially current conscious experience—was better known than the outside world. The teetering stacks of paper around me, I’m quite sure of. My visual experience as I look at those papers, my emotional experience as I contemplate the mess, my cognitive phenomenology as I drift in thought, staring at them—of these, I’m much less certain. My experiences flee and scatter as I reflect. I feel unpracticed, poorly equipped with the tools, categories, and skills that might help me dissect them.\nThey are gelatinous, disjointed, swift, shy, changeable. They are at once familiar and alien.\n\nI know better what’s in the burrito I’m eating than I know my gustatory experience as I eat it. I know it has cheese. In describing my experience, I resort to saying, vaguely, that the burrito tastes “cheesy,” without any very clear idea what this involves. Maybe, in fact, I’m just— or partly—inferring: The thing has cheese, so I must be having a taste experience of “cheesiness.” Maybe also, if I know that the object I’m seeing is evenly red, I’ll infer a visual experience of uniform “redness” as I look at it. Or if I know that weeding is unpleasant work, I’ll infer a negative emotion as I do it. Indeed, it can make great sense as a general strategy to start with judgments about plain, easily knowable facts of the outside world, then infer to what is more foreign and elusive, our consciousness as we experience that world. I doubt we can fully disentangle such inferences from more “genuinely introspective”\nprocesses.Special Guest: Eric Schwitzgebel.","content_html":"How well do you know your own feelings? Is our ability to know this about ourselves less reliable than what we know about the outside world around us? Is there anything we can do to make ourselves less "naive" and improve the reliability of introspection about conscious experiences?
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nDescartes, I think, had it quite backwards when he said the mind—including especially current conscious experience—was better known than the outside world. The teetering stacks of paper around me, I’m quite sure of. My visual experience as I look at those papers, my emotional experience as I contemplate the mess, my cognitive phenomenology as I drift in thought, staring at them—of these, I’m much less certain. My experiences flee and scatter as I reflect. I feel unpracticed, poorly equipped with the tools, categories, and skills that might help me dissect them.
\nThey are gelatinous, disjointed, swift, shy, changeable. They are at once familiar and alien.
I know better what’s in the burrito I’m eating than I know my gustatory experience as I eat it. I know it has cheese. In describing my experience, I resort to saying, vaguely, that the burrito tastes “cheesy,” without any very clear idea what this involves. Maybe, in fact, I’m just— or partly—inferring: The thing has cheese, so I must be having a taste experience of “cheesiness.” Maybe also, if I know that the object I’m seeing is evenly red, I’ll infer a visual experience of uniform “redness” as I look at it. Or if I know that weeding is unpleasant work, I’ll infer a negative emotion as I do it. Indeed, it can make great sense as a general strategy to start with judgments about plain, easily knowable facts of the outside world, then infer to what is more foreign and elusive, our consciousness as we experience that world. I doubt we can fully disentangle such inferences from more “genuinely introspective”
\nprocesses.
Special Guest: Eric Schwitzgebel.
","summary":"Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California, Riverside) argues that introspection is highly untrustworthy and that most people are poor introspectors of their own ongoing conscious experience.","date_published":"2020-04-08T16:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/cebc1cfb-74fa-4f14-819c-aa908491cf5f.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mp3","size_in_bytes":58783370,"duration_in_seconds":1836}]},{"id":"521b3172-3c67-481d-a350-1e59c6b733ee","title":"Redefine Statistical Significance with Edouard Machery","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/machery","content_text":"Are decisions made by scientists one century ago still with us and weigh down science? One decision involves the rules scientists play by when it comes to statistical significance, and more specifically, the rule that results fall below a .05 threshold to count as significant. The point of this threshold is to help minimize false positives. But .05 is consistent with at least 33% of results being false...or worse!\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nEdouard Machery\nThe paper\nWhat a nerdy debate about p-values shows about science — and how to fix it\nThe Alpha War by Edouard Machery \nJustify your Alpha by Lakens et al.\nShould We Redefine Statistical Significance? A Brains Blog Roundtable\nAbandon Statistical Signifcance by McShane et al.\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\n\"Ronald Fisher understood that the choice of 0.05 was arbitrary when he introduced it. Since then, theory and empirical evidence have demonstrated that a lower threshold is needed. A much larger pool of scientists are now asking a much larger number of questions, possibly with much lower prior odds of success. For research communities that continue to rely on null hypothesis significance testing, reducing the P value threshold for claims of new discoveries to 0.005 is an actionable step that will immediately improve reproducibility.\"Special Guest: Edouard Machery.","content_html":"Are decisions made by scientists one century ago still with us and weigh down science? One decision involves the rules scientists play by when it comes to statistical significance, and more specifically, the rule that results fall below a .05 threshold to count as significant. The point of this threshold is to help minimize false positives. But .05 is consistent with at least 33% of results being false...or worse!
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\n"Ronald Fisher understood that the choice of 0.05 was arbitrary when he introduced it. Since then, theory and empirical evidence have demonstrated that a lower threshold is needed. A much larger pool of scientists are now asking a much larger number of questions, possibly with much lower prior odds of success. For research communities that continue to rely on null hypothesis significance testing, reducing the P value threshold for claims of new discoveries to 0.005 is an actionable step that will immediately improve reproducibility."
Special Guest: Edouard Machery.
","summary":"Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh) talks about his paper with Benjamin et al. in Nature Human Behavior arguing that we should change the default threshold for “statistical significance\" by an order of magnitude.","date_published":"2020-04-04T05:45:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/521b3172-3c67-481d-a350-1e59c6b733ee.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mp3","size_in_bytes":99157393,"duration_in_seconds":3098}]},{"id":"d8b51780-ca3d-4841-b70a-5480fba34660","title":"Stop Talking About Fake News! with Joshua Habgood-Coote","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/habgood-coote","content_text":"What, if anything, does \"fake news\" or \"post truth\" actually mean? Are they thinly veiled political strategies that do as much harm to democracy as the things they attempt to describe? And if so why did so many academics and philosophers get caught up in using a series of terms with such serious problems?\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nJoshua Habgood-Coote\nThe paper\nBlog version of the paper\nResponse articles to the original paper by Etienne Brown and Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson & Rachel Sterken\nWardle: Let's retire the phrase 'fake news' and Fake news. It's complicated.\nThe Trouble With ‘Fake News’ by David Coady\nFake News: A Definition by Axel Gelfert\nthere’s no such thing as fake news (and that’s bad news) by Robert Talisse\nWhat to Do with Post-Truth by Lorna Finlayson\nFake Democracy, Bad News by Natalie Fenton and Des Freedman\nHow Propaganda Works by Jason Stanley\nAlgorithms of Oppression by Safiya Noble available on JSTOR\nLinguistic Disobedience by Yuliya Komska, Michelle Moyd, and David Gramling\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\nAccording to all these diagnoses, communication using ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ is problematic. If the terms are nonsense, any communication using these terms simply fails. If they are contested we face problems with talking across contexts, and if they are contested, we face the possibility of mistaking metalinguistic disputes for first order disagreements. ‘Fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are perhaps better off than ‘bryllg’ – we do at least have some sense what kinds of things might constitute their extensions – but they are very different from established terms with clear meanings like ‘cat’ and ‘blue’. Some basic questions about the extensions of these terms are up in the air. I haven’t come down on which diagnosis is correct – people with different views in the philosophy of language will be attracted to different diagnoses – but I think that because it is the worst outcome, we should take extremely seriously the possibility that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are nonsense. This suggests a short argument for abandonment: if we want to be sure that we are saying something by our sentences, we should avoid using ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’.Special Guest: Joshua Habgood-Coote.","content_html":"What, if anything, does "fake news" or "post truth" actually mean? Are they thinly veiled political strategies that do as much harm to democracy as the things they attempt to describe? And if so why did so many academics and philosophers get caught up in using a series of terms with such serious problems?
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\nAccording to all these diagnoses, communication using ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ is problematic. If the terms are nonsense, any communication using these terms simply fails. If they are contested we face problems with talking across contexts, and if they are contested, we face the possibility of mistaking metalinguistic disputes for first order disagreements. ‘Fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are perhaps better off than ‘bryllg’ – we do at least have some sense what kinds of things might constitute their extensions – but they are very different from established terms with clear meanings like ‘cat’ and ‘blue’. Some basic questions about the extensions of these terms are up in the air. I haven’t come down on which diagnosis is correct – people with different views in the philosophy of language will be attracted to different diagnoses – but I think that because it is the worst outcome, we should take extremely seriously the possibility that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are nonsense. This suggests a short argument for abandonment: if we want to be sure that we are saying something by our sentences, we should avoid using ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’.
Special Guest: Joshua Habgood-Coote.
","summary":"Joshua Habgood-Coote (University of Bristol) argues that we should abandon the terms \"fake news\" and \"post-truth\" because they are defective, redundant, and harmful to democracy.","date_published":"2020-04-04T05:30:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/d8b51780-ca3d-4841-b70a-5480fba34660.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mp3","size_in_bytes":66915184,"duration_in_seconds":2090}]},{"id":"4cc2bd3e-e683-4969-888b-dc1a365b3c43","title":"On Having Bad Persons as Friends with Jessica Isserow","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/isserow","content_text":"\"Nietzsche was friends with Wagner, Copperfield with Steerforth, Rick\nBlaine with Louis Renault...one who enters into a friendship with a bad person very much seems to have gone wrong somewhere,\" writes Isserow. But what is wrong, exactly, with choosing to make friends with bad people? Does it tell us something important about ourselves and could this fact maybe even reveal a glimmer of truth about cancel culture?\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nJessica Isserow\nThe paper - \"On Having Bad Persons as Friends\"\nBackground on philosophy of friendship\nInterview with Alexander Nehamas\nPaper by Cocking & Kennett \"Friendship and moral danger\"\nRecent work in philosophy of friendship\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\"Some values are incredibly weighty, and as such, they ought to occupy an\nimportant role in our moral priorities. One could understand an individual who was willing to forgive a friend’s failure to recycle; for this is a fault in spite of which we could plausibly accept someone. But an individual who discounted a friend’s rampant racism would suggest to us that she could not care less about the values which tell against racism, or for the potential victims of racist attitudes. At the very least, she would suggest to us that she does not stand for (or is not standing up for) such values in the fullest sense. Her willingness to discount vices of this extreme sort would suggest that there are certain values to which she is not properly responsive.\"\n\n\"I think that this gets right to the heart of where our individual goes wrong in\ncounting a bad person as a friend. The problem is that she likes him in spite of his shortcomings, and the shortcomings in question are incredibly weighty. But it would seem that they are not sufficiently weighty for her, and this points towards something worrying about her moral priorities. In choosing to pursue a friendship with a bad person, she effectively suggests that a serious moral flaw—vehement racism, say—is a minor vice that can be outweighed by a person’s other recommending qualities.\"Special Guest: Jessica Isserow.","content_html":""Nietzsche was friends with Wagner, Copperfield with Steerforth, Rick
\nBlaine with Louis Renault...one who enters into a friendship with a bad person very much seems to have gone wrong somewhere," writes Isserow. But what is wrong, exactly, with choosing to make friends with bad people? Does it tell us something important about ourselves and could this fact maybe even reveal a glimmer of truth about cancel culture?
Links and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n"Some values are incredibly weighty, and as such, they ought to occupy an
\nimportant role in our moral priorities. One could understand an individual who was willing to forgive a friend’s failure to recycle; for this is a fault in spite of which we could plausibly accept someone. But an individual who discounted a friend’s rampant racism would suggest to us that she could not care less about the values which tell against racism, or for the potential victims of racist attitudes. At the very least, she would suggest to us that she does not stand for (or is not standing up for) such values in the fullest sense. Her willingness to discount vices of this extreme sort would suggest that there are certain values to which she is not properly responsive."
"I think that this gets right to the heart of where our individual goes wrong in
\ncounting a bad person as a friend. The problem is that she likes him in spite of his shortcomings, and the shortcomings in question are incredibly weighty. But it would seem that they are not sufficiently weighty for her, and this points towards something worrying about her moral priorities. In choosing to pursue a friendship with a bad person, she effectively suggests that a serious moral flaw—vehement racism, say—is a minor vice that can be outweighed by a person’s other recommending qualities."
Special Guest: Jessica Isserow.
","summary":"Jessica Isserow (University of Leeds) talks about her paper \"On Having Bad Persons as Friends\" arguing that doing so reflects disordered moral priorities.","date_published":"2020-04-04T05:15:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/4cc2bd3e-e683-4969-888b-dc1a365b3c43.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mp3","size_in_bytes":41592081,"duration_in_seconds":1732}]},{"id":"6da5549a-67b5-4408-9877-72e0e68997ef","title":"Causing and Nothingness with Helen Beebee","url":"https://journalentries.fireside.fm/beebee","content_text":"Can the absense of something ever be a cause? For example, image you forget to water your plants and your plants all die. Did your failure to water them cause the plants to die? Many people report the intuition you obviously have caused your plants to die, but shocking as it may at first seem, could this intuition actually be wrong?\n\nLinks and Resources\n\n\nHelen Beebee\nThe paper - \"Causing and Nothingness\"\nThe volume - Counterfactuals and Causation\nBackground on The Metaphysics of Causation\nOn the Notion of Cause 'Philosophically Speaking' by Helen Steward\nBackground on the philosophy of David Lewis\nOverview paper by Sara Bernstein \"The metaphysics of omissions\"\nNew work in cognitive science by Henne et al. \"A Counterfactual Explanation for the Action Effect\"\n\"A Demonstration of the Causal Power of Absences\" by Tyron Goldschmidt (via DailyNous) get ready to lol\n\n\nPaper Quotes\n\n\"The causal history of the world is a mass of causal processes: events linked by a vast and complex web of causal relations. In order that the causal history of the world should look the way it does look, rather than some other way, there must have been no extra events impinging on it - for those extra events would have had effects that would have changed the causal history of the world in various ways. If Godzilla had impinged upon the causal history of the world, that causal history would have gone very differently. We might even, if circumstances demanded it, want to explain happenings in the world by citing Godzilla’s absence (though it’s hard to imagine that we should ever want to do so). But I see no need to think of Godzilla’s lack of impingement as a kind of causation.\"\n\n\"There just isn’t any objective feature that some absences have and others lack in virtue of which some absences are causes and others are not. So any definition of causation by absence which seeks to provide a principled distinction between absences which are and are not causes is bound to fail: no such definition will succeed in carving nature at its joints.\"Special Guest: Helen Beebee.","content_html":"Can the absense of something ever be a cause? For example, image you forget to water your plants and your plants all die. Did your failure to water them cause the plants to die? Many people report the intuition you obviously have caused your plants to die, but shocking as it may at first seem, could this intuition actually be wrong?
\n\nLinks and Resources
\n\nPaper Quotes
\n\n"The causal history of the world is a mass of causal processes: events linked by a vast and complex web of causal relations. In order that the causal history of the world should look the way it does look, rather than some other way, there must have been no extra events impinging on it - for those extra events would have had effects that would have changed the causal history of the world in various ways. If Godzilla had impinged upon the causal history of the world, that causal history would have gone very differently. We might even, if circumstances demanded it, want to explain happenings in the world by citing Godzilla’s absence (though it’s hard to imagine that we should ever want to do so). But I see no need to think of Godzilla’s lack of impingement as a kind of causation."
\n\n"There just isn’t any objective feature that some absences have and others lack in virtue of which some absences are causes and others are not. So any definition of causation by absence which seeks to provide a principled distinction between absences which are and are not causes is bound to fail: no such definition will succeed in carving nature at its joints."
Special Guest: Helen Beebee.
","summary":"Helen Beebee (Univerity of Manchester) talks about her paper \"Causing and Nothingness\" arguing that the absence of something can never be a cause.","date_published":"2020-04-04T05:00:00.000-04:00","attachments":[{"url":"https://aphid.fireside.fm/d/1437767933/6986e5e7-21bc-4dc2-883c-2b858724d4a1/6da5549a-67b5-4408-9877-72e0e68997ef.mp3","mime_type":"audio/mp3","size_in_bytes":75616259,"duration_in_seconds":2362}]}]}